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Environmental Law
by Travis M. Trimble*
In this survey period,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit decided two cases addressing the scope of agency
discretion to interpret statutes. In Friends of the Everglades v. South
Florida Water Management District,2 the Eleventh Circuit held that the
Environmental Protection Agency’s adoption of the “unitary waters”
definition of navigable waters under the Clean Water Act3 was reasonable4 even though that approach had been universally rejected by the
courts as an interpretation of the statute prior to the agency’s rule.5 In
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States,6 the Eleventh
Circuit upheld the United States Fish & Wildlife Service’s opinion that
a water project in Florida would not jeopardize the survival of an
endangered bird despite the project’s adverse effects on the bird’s habitat
because the opinion was supported by adequate evidence.7
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
held, in the latest round in the three-state battle for rights to the
Chattahoochee River’s water, that the Army Corps of Engineers had
violated federal law by the de facto reallocation of water stored in Lake
Lanier in north Georgia for use as a municipal water supply.8 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, on an
issue of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit, held that the court

* Instructor, University of Georgia School of Law. Mercer University (B.A., 1986);
University of North Carolina (M.A., 1988); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1993).
1. For analysis of Eleventh Circuit environmental law during the prior survey period,
see Travis M. Trimble, Environmental Law, 2008 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 60 MERCER L.
REV. 1193 (2009).
2. 570 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009).
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
4. Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1228.
5. Id. at 1218.
6. 566 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2009).
7. Id. at 1271.
8. In re Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1350 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
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lacked subject matter jurisdiction over claims challenging federal and
state agency permitting decisions regarding a natural gas pipeline
because the Energy Policy Act of 20059 gave the federal circuit courts
of appeal exclusive jurisdiction over permitting challenges to facilities or
projects within its scope.10
Finally, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia held that in order for a defendant to have “contributed to” the
handling or disposal of waste for purposes of liability under the citizensuit provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,11 the
defendant must have done affirmative acts that resulted in contamination; mere passive conduct was insufficient.12 Nevertheless, the district
court ruled that the defendant’s conduct created an issue of fact as to
whether it could be liable as an “operator” under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act.13
I.

CLEAN WATER ACT

In Friends of the Everglades v. South Florida Water Management
District,14 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
held that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) acted reasonably
in adopting a regulation15 exempting from the permitting requirements
of the Clean Water Act16 transfers of water from one body of navigable
water to another.17 The dispute concerned a dike and canals that were
constructed to collect rainwater and runoff from sugar fields and
industrial and residential areas near Lake Okeechobee in southern
Florida. The canal water became polluted with agricultural and
industrial contaminants contained in runoff. The Water District
periodically pumped water containing those contaminants from the
canals into the lake via pump stations in the dike.18 The plaintiffs
sought an injunction requiring the Water District to obtain a National

9. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered sections of 15 and 42 U.S.C.
(2006)).
10. Palm Beach County Envtl. Coal. v. Florida, 651 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1344–45 (S.D.
Fla. 2009).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–7000 (2006).
12. Scarlett & Assocs., Inc. v. Briarcliff Ctr. Partners, LLC, No. 1:05-CV-0145-CC, 2009
WL 3151089, at *12–13 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2009).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006); Scarlett & Assocs., 2009 WL 3151089, at *9.
14. 570 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009).
15. 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(i) (2009).
16. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
17. Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1228; see 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(i).
18. Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1214 & n.2.
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Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit19 for the
discharge of canal water into the lake via the pumps.20 The parties did
not dispute that (1) the canal water being pumped into the lake
contained pollutants, (2) both the canals and the lake are navigable
waters, or (3) the pumps were point sources, all within the meaning of
the Clean Water Act.21 At issue was whether “moving an existing
pollutant from one navigable water body to another is an ‘addition . . .
to navigable waters’ of that pollutant,” thus requiring an NPDES
permit.22
Prior to the Eleventh Circuit’s consideration of the issue on appeal, the
EPA adopted a regulation addressing the issue specifically.23 The
regulation, interpreting the definition of discharge in the Clean Water
Act,24 provides that “water transfers,” defined as “an activity that
conveys or connects waters of the United States [i.e., navigable waters]
without subjecting the transferred water to intervening industrial,
municipal, or commercial use,” are not subject to NPDES regulation
under the Clean Water Act.25 Thus, the issue before the Eleventh
Circuit was whether this regulation was entitled to Chevron deference26
from the court—that is, “whether the regulation is a reasonable
construction of an ambiguous statute.”27 More precisely, the issue the
court addressed was whether the term navigable waters in the statutory
definition means any discrete body of water otherwise defined as
“navigable”—in which case a pollutant would be added to a navigable
water body each time it were moved from one such body of water to

19. The Clean Water Act requires that a person obtain a permit under the regulatory
scheme known as the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System for the “discharge
of any pollutant” from a point source into a navigable water. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a).
20. Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1214.
21. Id. at 1216.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1218.
24. Discharge is defined in the Clean Water Act as “any addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
25. 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(i); Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1218–19.
26. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44
(1984).
27. Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1219. The court noted that the EPA’s
regulation is essentially a codification of the so-called unitary waters theory, under which
the movement of existing pollutants from one body of navigable water to another is not
considered an “addition” of pollutants subject to regulation under the Clean Water Act. Id.
at 1217. The court further noted that the “unitary waters theory” had been rejected by
every Circuit that had considered it, including the Eleventh (albeit in a vacated opinion),
though none of these courts had addressed the issue before the court—that is, whether the
statute is ambiguous and thus whether the unitary waters theory was a reasonable
interpretation of the statute. Id. at 1217–18.
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another, as in this case—or all navigable waters as a whole—in which
case a pollutant could only be added once.28
The court held that the EPA’s interpretation of navigable waters
means one entity as a whole for the purpose of determining when a
discharge that has occurred was reasonable.29 Following the standard
of review of an agency regulation mandated by Chevron,30 the court
first applied the “traditional tools of statutory construction” and
concluded that (1) the statutory language itself was ambiguous because
it could reasonably be read either way;31 (2) the context in which the
term navigable waters is used in the statute did not resolve the
ambiguity;32 and (3) the broader context of the statute read as a whole
did not resolve the ambiguity.33 The court concluded that “because the
EPA’s construction is one of the two readings we have found is reasonable, we cannot say that it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute’” under Chevron.34
II.

ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

In Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States,35 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that
language in House Report 69736 contained in the legislative history of
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA),37 which requires a federal
agency to “give the benefit of the doubt to the species” when evaluating

28. Id. at 1223.
29. Id. at 1228.
30. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44.
31. Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1223.
32. Id. at 1225.
33. Id. The plaintiffs argued that the “unitary waters” approach from the EPA’s
regulation would frustrate the primary objective of the Clean Water Act: the restoration
and maintenance of the “chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”
Id. at 1225–26. The plaintiffs pointed out, and the court seemed to agree, that the
regulation would lead to the “absurd” result that the NPDES permitting system “would
require no permit [for a project] to pump the most loathsome navigable water in the
country into the most pristine.” Id. at 1226. The court noted, though, that other provisions
of the NPDES also frustrated the Clean Water Act’s primary goal; notably, the permitting
system’s limitation to point sources where runoff from nonpoint sources of pollution is
“widely recognized as a serious water quality problem.” Id. at 1226–27. Thus, conforming
a particular statutory provision, such as the term navigable waters in the definition of
discharge, to the statute’s overall objective did not necessarily resolve its ambiguity. See
id. at 1226.
34. Id. at 1228 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
35. 566 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2009).
36. H.R. Rep. No. 96-697 (1979) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572.
37. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006).
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the effects of its projects under the ESA,38 did not render the Fish and
Wildlife Service’s biological opinion regarding the effect of part of an
Everglades restoration project on the endangered Everglades snail
kite39 arbitrary and capricious.40 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
the language means only that an agency could not base a decision not
to act to protect a species on inadequate scientific information.41 The
court held that the Service had adequate information and had considered
it in this case.42 Regardless, the court ultimately held, in part, that
when given Chevron deference,43 the Service’s “incidental take”
statement, which allowed for certain detrimental impacts to the kite’s
habitat, was defective because it used habitat impact measurements
rather than population count to determine when an incidental taking
would begin to jeopardize a species and trigger the need for further
evaluation by the agencies involved.44
The Army Corps of Engineers, one of the federal agencies involved in
the case, maintains “thousands of miles of canals and levees supported
by scores of pumps, gates, and dams” around the Everglades to control
flooding in southern Florida.45
One of the gates in this system—designated “S-12”—is located in the critical habitats of two
endangered bird species: the Everglades snail kite and the Cape Sable
seaside sparrow. Both species depend on the water level for survival.
The sparrow’s critical habitat lies, in part, to the south of the S-12 gate,
and the kite’s lies, in part, to the north. Both species require stable
periods of moderate to low water levels in their respective habitats to
feed and to nest. As part of a long-term project to restore the Everglades, the Corps began to conduct tests of water flow that involved
periodic and regular flooding into the Everglades through the S-12 gate.
These periodic floods resulted in a precipitous decline in the sparrow
population. In 1999 the Service determined that continued periodic
flooding through the S-12 gate would result in the extinction of the
sparrow, but preventing water from flowing through the gate to protect

38. H.R. Rep. No. 96-697, at 12.
39. An Everglades snail kite is a type of hawk. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 566 F.3d
at 1262.
40. Id. at 1268.
41. See id. at 1267.
42. See id. at 1268–69.
43. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
Under Chevron a court must defer to an agency rule-making decision, or its equivalent, so
long as (1) Congress’ intent on the question is unclear either from legislation or legislative
history, and (2) the agency decision is reasonable. Id.
44. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 566 F.3d at 1275.
45. Id. at 1261.
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the sparrow would adversely affect the kite. As a compromise, the Corps
and the Service developed an “Interim Plan,” which was approved in
2002, to provide for a water release schedule that would protect the
sparrow. In connection with this Plan, the Service issued a biological
opinion concluding that the Plan would not jeopardize the kite. Under
the Plan, the Corps allowed the water to back up north of the S-12 gate.
Consequently, the water backed up into the kite’s critical habitat and on
the Miccosukee Tribe’s land.46
As a result of earlier litigation by the Tribe,47 the Service issued
another biological opinion in 2006.48 Again, the Service concluded that
while the Plan would adversely affect the kite to some extent, the Plan
would not jeopardize the kite’s survival.49 The Service attached an
incidental take statement to the biological opinion,50 which acknowledged the adverse effects and stated that the Service and Corps would
reconsult about the Plan’s impact on the kite if the water level at a
specified point in the kite’s habitat dropped more than a certain amount
in a specified period during any year.51 The Tribe challenged the
Service’s 2006 biological opinion and associated incidental take
statement concerning the Plan.52 The district court granted summary
judgment to the Service on all of the Tribe’s claims, and the Tribe
appealed.53
A.

The Tribe’s Procedural Attack on the Service’s Biological Opinion

The Tribe first contended that the biological opinion was unlawful
because the opinion “fails to follow proper procedures, which require
using the best available scientific data, giving the benefit of the doubt
to the species, analyzing the environmental baseline and cumulative
effects, and issuing a proper incidental take statement.”54 With respect
to the best available scientific data, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
although an agency must consider all scientific data available at the
time, an agency’s decision regarding which scientific data and studies

46. Id. at 1261–63.
47. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (S.D.
Fla. 2006).
48. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 566 F.3d at 1264.
49. Id.
50. An incidental take statement is required by 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i) (2009).
51. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 566 F.3d at 1272. The incidental take regulation
requires immediate reconsultation when the amount or extent of incidental taking
approved by the statement is exceeded. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(4).
52. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 566 F.3d at 1264.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1264–65.
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constitute the “best available” data is entitled to deference upon
review.55 The Tribe specifically argued that the Service’s decision
about whether the kite would be jeopardized by the Service’s action
should not be entitled to deference because the Service ignored relevant
data in reaching its decision.56 The court rejected the Tribe’s argument
and concluded that the Service had, in fact, considered the data that the
Tribe claimed the Service had ignored.57
Regarding the Tribe’s argument that the “benefit of the doubt”
language in House Report 697 created a presumption in favor of the
species whenever the evidence is “balanced between likely jeopardy and
no jeopardy,” the court held that the language only applied to an
agency’s failure to protect a species when the data the agency relied on
was insufficient or uncertain.58 The court concluded that the data on
which the Service had based the 2006 biological opinion was adequate
to support the opinion; thus, the “benefit of the doubt” presumption did
not apply.59
Last, with respect to the Tribe’s concern about the Service’s analysis
of the environmental baseline and cumulative effects, the court held that
the Service had met the ESA’s requirements to define an environmental
baseline for its opinion and to consider the cumulative impacts of past
and present federal, state, and private activities on the kite, both in
connection with the 2006 biological opinion and in connection with the
Service’s separate evaluations of those projects.60 Overall, the Tribe’s
procedural attacks on the biological opinion failed.61
B.

The Tribe’s Arbitrary and Capriciousness Argument

The Tribe’s second contention was that the 2006 biological opinion was
arbitrary and capricious.62 In response to this argument, the court
noted that the ESA prohibits a federal agency from taking any action
that will jeopardize an endangered species’ continued existence or
adversely modify its habitat.63 The biological opinion acknowledged
several adverse consequences to the kite resulting from the periodic

55. Id. at 1265.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1266.
58. Id. at 1267.
59. Id. at 1267–68. The court did not reach the question of whether the “benefit of the
doubt” language created a presumption in favor of the species when the agency’s evidence
is equally balanced between jeopardy to the species and no jeopardy. See id. at 1267–68.
60. Id. at 1268–69.
61. Id. at 1269.
62. Id. at 1265.
63. Id. at 1270 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)).
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flooding of its habitat under the Plan but concluded that the Plan would
result in no permanent loss of kite habitat.64 The court noted that
adverse modification within the meaning of the ESA was not limited to
permanent loss of habitat; temporary habitat loss could constitute
adverse modification depending on the life cycle of the species.65 The
court held that an agency’s assessment of whether a federal action
adversely modified a species’ habitat must take into account the species’
life cycle, so that even a short-term habitat loss would not permanently
jeopardize the species.66 The court concluded, however, that the Service
had included in its opinion the fact that the kite was a “long-lived
species . . . with a high adult survival rate and a wide range” beyond the
area impacted by the Plan.67 Accordingly, the Service’s biological
opinion that the Plan would not adversely modify the kite’s habitat was
not arbitrary and capricious, notwithstanding the opinion’s acknowledgement of the short-term negative impacts to the kite from the flooding.68
C. The Tribe’s Argument that the Incidental Take Statement was
Defective
The Tribe’s final contention was that the incidental take statement the
Service issued in conjunction with the 2006 biological opinion was
defective because it failed to set a trigger for agency reevaluation of the
Plan based on a population count of the kite.69 The Service followed its
Endangered Species Consultation Handbook70 in preparing the take
statement.71 The Handbook states that an incidental take “may be
‘expressed as [either] the number of individuals [of the species reasonably likely to be] taken or the extent of habitat likely to be destroyed or
disturbed.’ ”72 The court held that the Service’s Handbook was entitled
to Chevron deference because it was “created following the same

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1271.
67. Id.
68. Id. The court expressly limited its holding on this issue to the facts of the case:
that the Plan caused “temporary flooding of twenty percent of the [kite’s] critical habitat”;
that the kite is a species with a long life span, high survival rate, and extensive range; and
that the purpose of the flooding is to “restore the natural flow of the Everglades” and to
avoid the extinction of the endangered sparrow. Id.
69. Id. at 1265, 1271–72.
70. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED
SPECIES CONSULTATION HANDBOOK (1998) [hereinafter CONSULTATION HANDBOOK],
available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/consultations/S7hndbk/S7hndbk.htm.
71. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 566 F.2d at 1272.
72. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 70,
at 4–47).
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administrative procedures that official regulations undergo.”73 In
applying the Chevron test, the court concluded that the Service’s
incidental take limit based on the Plan’s impact to habitat was not
entitled to deference from the court because Congress had directly
spoken to the issue, and its intent was clear: the legislative history of
the ESA establishes that “Congress wanted incidental take to be stated
in numbers of animals where practical, not in terms of habitat markers.”74 Although the Service defended its use of habitat markers, the
record showed that the Service routinely made population counts of the
kite and had done so annually since 1969.75 For these reasons, the
court concluded that counting the kite was not impractical; therefore, the
trigger for further consultation in the incidental take statement should
have been based on a population count, not habitat impact.76
The court affirmed summary judgment for the Service as to its claim
that the kite would not be jeopardized by the Plan but vacated the ruling
as to the incidental take statement.77
III.

WATER SUPPLY ACT: TRI-STATE WATER LITIGATION

In In re Tri-State Water Rights Litigation,78 the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida held that the Army
Corps of Engineers’ operation of Buford Dam on Lake Lanier in Georgia
violated the Water Supply Act of 1958 (WSA)79 by cumulatively
reallocating over twenty percent of the water storage capacity of Lake
Lanier to municipal water supply without obtaining the approval of
Congress.80
A reservoir in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint river basin (ACF
Basin) was authorized by Congress in 1945 and 1946.81 The Lake
Lanier site was chosen in 1947,82 and Buford Dam was completed in
1958, to be operated by the Corps.83 (Lake Lanier and the Buford Dam
are hereinafter referred to as the Project). The only municipal water

73. Id. at 1273.
74. Id. at 1274.
75. Id. at 1275.
76. Id.
77. Id. The court noted that the incidental take statement would need to include a
population-count trigger for agency reconsultation regarding the effect of the Plan on the
kite. Id.
78. 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
79. 43 U.S.C. § 390b (2006).
80. In re Tri-State Water Rights, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 1350.
81. Id. at 1309.
82. See id. at 1312–13.
83. Id. at 1319, 1321.
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supply withdrawals from Lake Lanier approved by the Legislature as
part of the original Project were for Gainesville and Buford, Georgia.84
Both cities’ municipal water intake on the Chattahoochee River were to
be inundated by the lake.85 In addition, the operation of the dam
would guarantee 600 cubic feet per second (cfs) of water flow in the
Chattahoochee River through Atlanta.86
Over time, the Corps through various agreements and contracts with
municipalities gradually increased the amount of water in the lake
allocated to water supply.87 By 2006 the use of the lake’s water for
water supply accounted for over 21.5% of the lake’s storage capacity.88
In 1989 the Corps issued a draft of a Post-Authorization Change (PAC)
report together with a proposed Water Control Plan (WCP) for the ACF
Basin to be submitted to Congress recommending that Congress approve
a reallocation of water storage in Lake Lanier for water supply
purposes.89 In 1990, before the WCP was adopted, Alabama filed suit
against the Corps in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama, challenging the WCP and the various water supply
contracts between the Corps and municipalities in the metro Atlanta
area. Florida moved to intervene as a plaintiff and Georgia as a
defendant. The suit was stayed while a commission created by
Congress, comprised of governors of the three states, attempted to
resolve the various competing water use issues.90
In 2001 Georgia filed a lawsuit challenging the Corps’ denial of a
request to reallocate a percentage of Lake Lanier’s storage capacity for
water supply.91 Meanwhile, a power industry group—Southeastern
Federal Power Customers—sued the Corps in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, claiming that the Corps’ reallocation
of Lake Lanier’s water to municipal water supply for Georgia communities “harmed the [power companies’] ability to produce power from

84. Id. at 1315 & n.6, 1348.
85. Id. at 1333, 1348.
86. Id. at 1349.
87. See id. at 1348.
88. Id. at 1350. For example, in 1982 the Corps reached an agreement with Georgia
Power to increase the minimum water release from the lake during the summer to 1750
cfs from 600 cfs, the amount originally authorized by the Corps’ operating manual for
Buford Dam. Id. at 1324. The Corps also entered into contracts with Gwinnett County
and the City of Cumming to allow for withdrawals directly from the lake. Id. at 1326.
89. Id. at 1331–32.
90. Id. at 1335–36.
91. Id. at 1336.
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Buford Dam and increased the cost of that power.”92 In 2007 these
cases were eventually consolidated into the present multidistrict
litigation.93
According to the WSA, modifications to a reservoir that would
“seriously affect the purposes for which [the reservoir] was authorized
. . . or which would involve major structural or operational changes shall
be made only upon the approval of Congress.”94 Based on an extensive
review of the legislative history of authorization of and cost appropriations for the Project, the court held that the original legislatively
approved purposes for the Project were power generation, flood control,
and flow control for downstream navigation.95 The purposes did not
include water supply.96 The court noted that while water supply for
the Atlanta metropolitan area had frequently been mentioned in
connection with the authorization and funding of the Project, the parties
involved always treated water supply as an incidental benefit to
municipalities arising from the regulation of flow in the river downstream from the dam.97
The court first concluded that water supply was not an authorized
purpose of the Project.98 Next, the court evaluated the three separate
actual or proposed reallocations of water to water supply: (1) the
municipal uses the Corps had already allowed as of 1990 when the first
suit was filed, (2) the reallocations recommended by the Corps in the
1989 PAC report, and (3) Georgia’s request to the Corps in 2000.99 The
court held that the reallocations the Corps had already allowed violated
the WSA because the reallocations constituted major changes to the
Project purposes and because the Corps had failed to obtain the approval
of Congress.100 The court also held that the reallocations to water
supply proposed in the Corps’ PAC report and those requested by

92. Id. In 2003 the Corps, the Georgia parties, and the power company group settled
the District of Columbia case with an agreement that required the Corps to negotiate water
supply contracts with Gwinnett County, Gainesville, and the Atlanta Regional Commission.
Id. at 1336–37. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed the district court’s approval of the settlement agreement in 2008, and the case
was remanded and then included in the present multidistrict case. Id. at 1339 (citing Se.
Fed. Power Customers v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1316, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
93. Id. at 1337–38.
94. 43 U.S.C. § 390b(d).
95. In re Tri-State Water Rights, 639 F. Supp. at 1345.
96. Id. at 1347.
97. Id. at 1345–46.
98. Id. at 1347.
99. Id. at 1348–52.
100. Id. at 1350.
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Georgia constituted major changes to the purposes of the Project and
would require the approval of Congress.101
The court further rejected the Corps’ contention that the reallocations
to water supply it had previously allowed did not significantly affect the
Project’s authorized purposes.102 The court concluded that the Corps’
reallocation of water in the lake for water supply had seriously affected
power generation at the dam, which was one of the Project’s authorized
purposes.103
Ultimately, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment on their WSA claims.104 The court stayed the portion of the
litigation involving the WSA claims for three years to allow the parties
“to obtain Congress’s approval for the operational changes” to the Project
purposes that would allow storage for water supply in Lake Lanier.105
The court noted that at the end of the stay period its order would take
effect.106 As a practical matter, this would mean that the Corps would
be required to return to baseline (mid 1970s level) operation of the
Project—release of only 600 cfs of water flow from Buford Dam during
off-peak (power generation) hours and withdrawal of water from the lake
only by Gainesville and Buford.107 The court acknowledged that this
would be a “draconian result,” but the only one possible under the
WSA.108
IV.

ENERGY SUPPLY ACT—JURISDICTION

In Palm Beach County Environmental Coalition v. Florida,109 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida decided
an issue of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit.110 The court held
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims
challenging federal and state agency permitting decisions regarding a
natural gas pipeline because under the Energy Policy Act of 2005111

101. Id. at 1352.
102. Id. at 1354.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 1354, 1356.
105. Id. at 1355.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 651 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
110. Id. at 1344.
111. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 15 and
42 U.S.C. (2006)).
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the federal courts of appeal had exclusive original jurisdiction over such
decisions.112
In 2005 the defendant Florida Power & Light Co. began building a
new power plant in Palm Beach County. Simultaneously, the defendant
Gulfstream Natural Gas Systems began building a natural gas pipeline
to the plant from another county to supply the plant.113 The pipeline
was to cross federal jurisdictional waters as well as state conservation
areas and, thus, required under the Clean Water Act114 and the Rivers
and Harbors Act115 that the defendants obtain permits.116 The Army
Corps of Engineers authorized the pipeline construction under Nationwide Permit 12 (allowing utility line activities).117
The plaintiffs challenged the Corps’ permitting decision,118 contending that the Corps had failed to evaluate the pipeline as part of the
entire power plant project and thus improperly granted the permits.119
The plaintiffs brought claims relevant to the Corps’ permitting decisions
under the citizen-suit provisions of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969,120 the Endangered Species Act of 1973,121 the Clean
Water Act, and the Rivers and Harbors Act.122

112. Palm Beach County Envtl. Coal., 651 F. Supp. 2d at 1345.
113. Id. at 1332.
114. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
115. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401–467n (2006).
116. Palm Beach County Envtl. Coal., 651 F. Supp. 2d at 1332.
117. Id. at 1333.
118. The plaintiffs brought an eight-count complaint against federal, state, county, and
private defendants, alleging violations of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431 (2006),
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2006), the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006), the Clean Water Act, the
Rivers and Harbors Act, the Florida Water Resources Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 373.012–373.71 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010), the Florida Government in the Sunshine
Law, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (West 2009), and federal and state RICO statutes. Palm
Beach County Envtl. Coal., 651 F. Supp. 2d at 1334. The court dismissed the RICO counts
as to all defendants for failure to state a claim. Id. at 1340, 1354. The court dismissed the
remaining federal law counts as to the state defendants due to their immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI, and as to the county for failure to state a
claim. Palm Beach County Envtl. Coal., 651 F. Supp. 2d at 1338–39, 1354. The remaining
federal counts as to the federal and private defendants fell under the court’s ruling that
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Energy Policy Act. Id. at 1345, 1354. The
court declined to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims. Id. at 1354.
119. Palm Beach County Envtl. Coal., 651 F. Supp. 2d at 1333.
120. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006).
121. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006).
122. Palm Beach County Envtl. Coal., 651 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
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The court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over these
claims.123 The court noted that under the Natural Gas Act of 1938
(NGA),124 the transportation and sale of natural gas in interstate
commerce is comprehensively regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.125 The NGA was amended in 2005 by the Energy
Policy Act, which gives United States Courts of Appeals “ ‘original and
exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action for the review of an order or
action of a Federal agency . . . acting pursuant to Federal law to issue,
condition, or deny any permit, license, concurrence, or approval . . .
required under Federal law’ for the construction of a natural gas
facility.”126 The court concluded that transmission pipelines were by
implication treated as “facilities” under relevant regulations.127 The
court further concluded that the original exclusive jurisdiction provision
of the Energy Policy Act applied to challenges to both federal and state
permitting decisions; therefore, the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the claims.128 The court noted that unlike many
federal statutes, the Energy Policy Act provision “does not have the
qualifying language . . . such as ‘for claims brought pursuant to’ this Act,
or ‘for claims arising under’ [the] Act.”129 Accordingly, the court stated,
“. . . there is no language that limits this provision to only those claims
specifically brought under the Natural Gas Act.”130
V.

CERCLA/RCRA

In Scarlett & Associates, Inc. v. Briarcliff Center Partners, LLC,131
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
ruled that evidence sufficient to create a dispute over a material fact as
to whether the manager of a shopping center could be an “operator” for
purposes of liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)132 was insufficient to create

123. Id. at 1345.
124. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717z (2006).
125. Palm Beach County Envtl. Coal., 651 F. Supp. 2d at 1342.
126. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1)).
127. Id. at 1343.
128. Id. at 1345.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. No. 1:05-CV-0145-CL, 2009 WL 3151089 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2009).
132. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006); Scarlett & Assocs., 2009 WL 3151089, at *9.
Under CERCLA, an “operator” for liability purposes is defined simply as “any person . . .
operating [a] facility” where contamination exists. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(A)(ii). The court ruled
that a genuine dispute over a material fact existed as to whether the defendant in this case
acted as an operator under the CERCLA definition of operator as refined by the United
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a dispute over a material fact as to whether the manager “contributed
to” the hazardous waste contamination for the purposes of liability under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)133 citizen-suit
provision.134 As part of its ruling on the RCRA claim, the court
implicitly held that in order to have “contributed to” the handling or
disposal of waste within the meaning of RCRA, a person must have
engaged in “affirmative,” as opposed to merely “passive,” conduct with
regard to the waste.135
In this case, the plaintiff controlled a shopping center pursuant to a
lease with the owner of the land on which the center was located. The
plaintiff in turn leased the shopping center to AmSouth Bank of Florida,
which entered into leases with the individual owners of businesses in the
shopping center, including a dry cleaning business. In the early 1990s,
tetrachloroethene (PCE) contamination was discovered in the surface
area, soil, and groundwater around the dry cleaning business. In 1997
the Georgia Enivonmental Protection Division (GEPD) initiated
remediation proceedings and identified responsible parties, including the
plaintiff.136
In 2005 the plaintiff entered into a consent order with the GEPD to
remediate the property.137 The plaintiff subsequently sued several
defendants, including Faison & Associates, LLC, which had managed the
shopping center on behalf of AmSouth from 1995 to 1997.138 Faison’s
responsibilities were set out in a management agreement with the
plaintiff ’s lessee and included “obtaining all necessary governmental
approval and permits and performing such acts necessary to effect
AmSouth’s compliance with all laws applicable to the operation of the
Shopping Center.”139 Faison was not a party to the lease with the dry
cleaner and was not involved in the day-to-day operation of the dry

States Supreme Court in United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998), which held that
an operator under CERCLA “ ‘is simply someone who directs the workings of, manages, or
conducts the affairs of [a] facility.’ ” Scarlett & Assocs., 2009 WL 3151089, at *9 (quoting
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66–67).
133. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006). Under RCRA’s citizen-suit provision, a person
may seek injunctive relief from “any person, including . . . any past or present . . . owner
or operator [of a facility] who has contributed or is contributing to the past or present
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste.”
Id. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
134. Scarlett & Assocs., 2009 WL 3151089, at *13.
135. Id.
136. Id. at *1–2.
137. Id. at *3.
138. See id. at *1–2.
139. Id. at *4.
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cleaner or any other business in the shopping center.140 However,
Faison “took responsibility for ensuring that the operators of the dry
cleaning business complied with the Environmental Protection Agency’s
reporting requirements on dry cleaning facilities covering PCE emissions, equipment monitoring and repair, and accounting of PCE
consumption.”141
The plaintiff ’s claims against Faison included claims that (1) Faison
was a former “operator” of the facility (that is, the shopping center,
including the dry cleaner) under CERLCA, thus liable to the plaintiff for
cost recovery,142 and (2) that Faison was a former operator who had
contributed to the handling, storage, or disposal of PCE within the
meaning of the citizen suit provision of RCRA and, thus, should be
ordered to contribute to the remediation.143 The plaintiff and Faison
each moved for summary judgment on these claims and others.144
On the plaintiff ’s CERCLA “operator” claim against Faison, the court
concluded that issues of fact precluded summary judgment.145 The
court followed the United States Supreme Court’s definition of operator
under CERCLA from United States v. Bestfoods146—namely, that “ ‘[a]n
operator must manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related
to pollution, that is, operations having to do with leakage or disposal of
hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with environmental
regulations.’”147 Applying this definition, the court noted that evidence
showed that Faison “sent the dry cleaner a certified letter advising the
dry cleaner of reporting requirements of the [EPA]” and “[i]n order to . . .
[e]nsure governmental compliance [the defendant’s agent] requested
copies of the documentation that the dry cleaner was required to provide
to the EPA or an explanation as to why the dry cleaner was exempt.”148 The court concluded that this evidence, together with
Faison’s authority under his management agreement to ensure his
principal’s compliance with law, “create[d] a genuine issue as to whether
Faison managed the operations of the dry cleaner specifically related to
pollution.”149

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *6, *9.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *1, *6.
Id. at *9.
524 U.S. 51 (1998).
Scarlett & Assocs., 2009 WL 3151089, at *9 (quoting Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66–67).
Id.
Id.
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To the contrary, on the plaintiff ’s RCRA citizen-suit claim, the court
concluded that even if Faison could be considered an “operator” for
purposes of the provision,150 Faison did not “contribute” to the handling or disposal of hazardous waste.151 Noting that the Eleventh
Circuit has not yet determined “the precise circumstances in which an
owner or operator meets the requirement of having contributed to” the
handling or disposal of hazardous waste,152 the court followed the
approach of “the vast majority of courts that have considered this
issue”—namely, that RCRA requires “affirmative action rather than
merely passive conduct.”153 More specifically, the court stated that
although the evidence supported the inference that Faison played a
“minimal role” in managing the dry cleaner’s operations, the evidence
“far from shows that Faison acted as a determining factor over either the
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of PCE.”154
Overall, the court’s conclusion implies that a plaintiff must meet a
higher standard of proof to establish liability under RCRA’s citizen suit
provision than under CERCLA.

150.
See id.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Operator is generally held to have the same meaning under CERCLA and RCRA.
at *11.
Id. at *12.
Id.
Id. at *13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.

